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This Article argues that the Reconstruction Amendments incorporated
the human dignity values of the Declarationof Independence. The original
Constitution contained clauses, which protected the institution of slavery,
that were irreconcilablewith the normative commitments the nation had
undertaken at independence. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments set the country aright by formally incorporating the
Declaration of Independence's principles for representative governance
into the Constitution.
The Declaration of Independence provides valuable insights into
matters of human dignity, privacy, and self-government. Its statements
about human rights, equality, and popular sovereignty establish a
foundational rule of interpretation. While the Supreme Court has rarely
parsed the significance of the Declaration of Independence, several
judicial predicates exist to provide guidance to courts and scholars for
developing constitutional doctrines arisingfrom the founding values of
independence. The principles espoused by the document should inform
substantive constitutional interpretation in matters of pressing legal
concern, such as voting and marriageequality.
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INTRODUCTION: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AS
THE NORMATIVE AND STRUCTURAL STATEMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Declaration of Independence is often regarded as a historical
relic-one that the American public celebrates on the Fourth of July but
typically leaves out of its constitutional discourse. This perspective
dismisses the many clauses of the Declaration that overlap with those of the
Constitution. The two texts, in fact, establish complementary constitutional
values. Several of the Declaration's paragraphs clarify the founding
generation's meaning. The document is therefore a constructive tool for
parsing the meaning of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Declaration
contains fundamental principles for fulfilling the aims, duties, and
functions of government. Those principles place limits and impose
obligations on public officials, rendering unconstitutional any actions,
policies, or laws to the contrary. Its statements about human rights,
equality, and self-government establish what Senator Charles Sumner
1
called a "sovereign rule of interpretation." I
By declaring independence, the people announced their sovereignty
and the government's duty to constitute institutions in order to secure
inalienable rights. A constitutional state is one that must abide by
normative and written limits on its uses of power for the people's safety
and happiness. Both the Declaration and Constitution establish mandates of
government, violations of which constitute arbitrary rule. Both set the
normative terms for limited government. The original Constitution
contained clauses, which protected the institution of slavery, that were
irreconcilable with the moral commitments the nation undertook at
independence. The Reconstruction Amendments were meant to set the
country aright by formally incorporating the Declaration's principle of
representative governance into the Constitution. That principle had been
foundational to the nation's ethos from its founding in 1776, but by
protecting slavery, the 1787 Constitution violated the Declaration's
mandate that government secure liberal equality for the common good. The
Reconstruction Amendments were a major step forward because they
empowered Congress to enact legislation conducive to a society of free and
equal individuals.2
1. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 828 (1872) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
2. Even the Reconstruction Amendments proved to be insufficient during the nineteenth century
for wiping out inequalities based on characteristics such as sex and national origin. See ALEXANDER
TSESIS, WE SHALL OVERCOME: A HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE LAW 164-67 (2008) (discussing

anti-immigrant sentiments during the Gilded Age); Alexander Tsesis, Gender Discriminationand the
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In this Article, I demonstrate the Declaration's interpretive value as a
substantive statement of rights and representative structures. Part I parses
paragraphs of the Declaration in relation to analogous normative and
structural clauses of the Constitution. That Part also analyzes how Supreme
Court Justices have adopted portions of the Declaration into constitutional
interpretations about privacy, human dignity, and self-governance. Part I
ends by demonstrating the commensurability between the Declaration's
and Constitution's statements about self-government and representative
democracy. Part II evaluates how the Constitution fell short of the
Declaration's ideals. That Part also explains, however, that after the Civil
War, ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments firmly incorporated
the Declaration's values, which has broad-ranging interpretive
implications.
I. TEXT, NORMS, AND STRUCTURE
The text of the Constitution plays an incontrovertibly important role in
adjudication. It is, in fact, tautological to say that courts draw on specific
clauses of the Constitution to decide cases. This proposition applies to
judicial evaluations of Article III powers, cases concerned with legislative
powers under Article I, and cases involving executive powers under Article
II. There is rarely, however, any reflection on, and even more rarely any
analysis of, whether the Declaration of Independence has aught to say
about the legitimacy of a policy, government decision, or resolution of case
or controversy. This is most unfortunate because, as this Part demonstrates,
there are a significant number of clauses in the Declaration that are
precisely on point. They yield not only historical insights, valuable no
doubt to originalist and other historical forms of interpretation, but also
provide a normative framework for a living constitutional interpretation.
A variety of passages from the Declaration sound in the lexicon of
constitutional interpretation. This Part considers the historical and
structural aspects of the Declaration that make it closely related to and,
arguably, indispensable to constitutional interpretation. Later in the Article,
Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1641, 1672-79 (2012) (detailing the effects of the word
"male" being used in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and First Wave Feminists' responses and
activism to undermine its negative impact on women's rights efforts). For a discussion on the original
federalist meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and congressional powers, see Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Congress's Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the
Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 263 (2005) ("[T]he framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment... understood the Fourteenth Amendment, at a minimum, as a delegation to Congress of
the plenary power to define and enforce in the federal courts the substantive rights of U.S. citizens that
they had just exercised in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866.").
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I examine whether the Declaration's statements of national purpose
influenced the founding and reconstruction generations' understandings of
core national commitments to liberty and equality.
Constitutional clauses carry meaning that can readily be discerned by
ordinary people. 3 Textual interpretation of the Constitution and the
Declaration provides a starting point for identifying whether they are
related. As it turns out, there are many overlapping and complementary
passages of the Declaration and the Constitution. When its text is
understood in the context of history and social mores, the Declaration
contains a wealth of substantive provisions for lawmaking, adjudication,
and enforcement of constitutional principles.
A. NORMATIVE AND STRUCTURAL OVERLAP
The Declaration is both a statement of national independence and a
foundational guarantee of individual rights and popular self-government.
The document is the country's original written statement of national
principle, purpose, and sovereignty. The framers later sculpted the detailed
powers to carry out the purposes of the Declaration, first by the ratification
of the Articles of Confederation and then by the Constitution. Inclusion of
broadly understood natural rights principles in the Declaration may help to
explain why the original Constitution lacked a bill of rights. James
Madison, for example, initially opposed its inclusion in the Constitution
because he was concerned that it might be interpreted to only protect
enumerated rights and thereby leave other natural rights unprotected
against government overreaching. 4 Alexander Hamilton, in his Federalist
No. 84, likewise cautioned against trying to provide an exhaustive list of
constitutionally protected rights.5 He explained that while in the past kings
had granted bills of rights to their subjects, the power of American
government came from the people, who did not need to reserve rights
3. I accept here, without analyzing, Philip Bobbitt's assertion that textual modality of
constitutional interpretation can be "attributed to arguments" that an "average person" would
understand from "the text of the Constitution." PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 14
(1991). Unlike Larry Solum, I do not think, at least in difficult cases, that interpretation of text can, nor
should be, done separately from constructing its meaning. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 456-57, 459, 472 (2013). While space
limitations do not permit me to deal with this issue in this Article, for more information, see
ALEXANDER TSESIS, CONSTITUTIONAL ETHOS (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at chapter 7).
4. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 295, 297 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977) ("My own opinion has
always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be
included in the enumeration.").
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 510-15 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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6
explicitly because they "surrender nothing" by ratifying the Constitution.
That is, they surrendered none of those rights already asserted to be
inalienable in the Declaration.

This is not to say that the Declaration was itself a substitute for the
Bill of Rights, but rather that Thomas Jefferson, who drafted the document,
and the Second Continental Congress, which voted for it, regarded the
Declaration to be an official statement of the national government's
obligation to secure the people's inalienable rights. In modem language, we
might say that rights are not grants of the government as in England, where
rights had been endowed by the King,7 but intrinsic to human dignity.
When the Bill of Rights was ratified, fifteen years after the adoption of the
Declaration, the decision to include the Unenumerated Rights Clause of the
Ninth Amendment demonstrated the framers' persistent belief that
inalienable, natural human rights were not the creation of the state, but the
birthright of the people.
One of the best-known phrases of American culture, taught to students
from their formative years in grammar school, parses the rights retained by
the people against the abuses of government. The Declaration
unequivocally asserts that all people are "endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness." 8 The clause creates no explicit rights but makes
clear that from the nation's independence, the people imposed on
government the obligation to safeguard human dignity.
By referring to the "pursuit of Happiness," Jefferson erected a broad
platform for future generations to advance civil rights and civil liberties,
even though he and his contemporaries were unable to fathom all of its
implications. That phrase embodied a variety of guarantees, including those
for the protection of personal safety, public security, and private property. 9
Jefferson worked in the milieu of eighteenth century political philosophers
who understood "Happiness" in the context of the benefits enjoyed by
Id. at 513.
6.
7.
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES, PENNSYLVANIA 383-84 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (recounting
statements made by James Wilson during the debates of the Pennsylvania Convention on November 28,
1787 and published in the Pennsylvania Herald) (stating that while the Magna Carta regarded the
declared liberties to be "the gift or grant of the king," the Constitution, on the other hand, was a grant of
power to government from the people, who retained their natural liberties).
8.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
9. See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
134 (1997).
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members of constitutional societies. 10 For example, the right to quiet
possession of property has, from the nation's founding, been regarded as
necessary for people to pursue happiness. It was, therefore, understood that
protection and enjoyment of property required regulations against
infringements.1 1 The Bill of Rights and Reconstruction Amendments do not
precisely adopt the Declaration's phrasing, but rather a subset of the ideal.
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee that no person shall be deprived "of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." 12 Yet the property guaranteed is just one
aspect of the "pursuit of Happiness." 1 3 While the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' guarantees are more narrowly worded than the Declaration's
abstract mandate of national governance, they by no means renounce the
broad concept of government's obligation to safeguard people's ability to
pursue happiness, and as we will see in Part II.B, the Supreme Court has
expanded the relevance of due process to a broad range of pursuits of
happiness.
Both the Constitution and Declaration also secure the right of free
speech, which is intrinsic to human dignity and essential to the interactive
community of equals. 4 One aspect of free expression that the First
Amendment protects is the right to "petition the Government for a redress
of grievances."' 15 This safeguard is meant to prevent the types of abuses
against which the Declaration states: "[i]n every stage of these Oppressions
we have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble Terms: Our repeated
Petitions have been answered only by repeated Injury."'16 The two
10. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The
makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.").
11.
See, e.g., Charge Delivered by the Honourable Judge Campbell, to the Grand Jury, at the
Beginning of the Superior Court of Washington District, at September Term, and to the GrandJury of
Hamilton District, at the Commencement of the Session in October Last, N.C. J., Dec. 14, 1795, at 1
("The end of civil society is procuring for the citizens whatever their necessities require, the
conveniences and accommodations of life, and in general, whatever constitutes happiness, with the
peaceful possession of property, a method of obtaining justice with security, and a mutual defence
against all violence from without."); Extractfrom the Charge of the Hon. Judge Sullivan to the Grand
Jury, at the Session of the FederalCourtfor the Districtof Newhampshire on the 13th Instant, SALEM
GAZETTE, July 27, 1790, at 2 (asserting that people constitute governments to pursue happiness, which
"consists in promoting, increasing and securing the felicity of all and ensuring to the peaceable and
industrious, the quiet possession of the property which they have acquired").
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id amend. XIV, § 1.
13.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2.
14. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 183 n.1 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part)
("Freedom of speech is itself an end because the human community is in large measure defined through
speech; freedom of speech is therefore intrinsic to individual dignity.").
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30.

2016]

THE DECLARATIONAND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

375

documents are clearly not identical. The First Amendment deals with the
rights of the press, free exercise of religion, and assembly, as well as
prohibiting the establishment of an official religion. None of these appear
in the Declaration. The constitutional value of the latter should not,
however, be dismissed. The Declaration's statement on petitioning clarifies
the meaning of the First Amendment phrase. The Declaration makes
evident that merely allowing people to petition their leaders is not the sole
interest the people sought to protect through independence. Instead, the
Petition Clause of the First Amendment should be understood to mean the
right to effective petition, where effectiveness of petitioning is measured by
the degree of government commitment to seriously responding to the
people's demands for the redress of public grievances. And the
responsiveness of government to the people's petitions of grievances is a
judicially reviewable predicate of the Preamble's mandate that government
act for their general welfare.
Guarantees of rights are not the only similarities between the
Constitution and Declaration. They also contain several overlapping
structural features of government, although the Constitution fleshes those
out in greater detail than its predecessor.
In their basic forms, both documents establish mandates for
representative governance. The Constitution and Declaration announce a
system of government in which policies and practices should be judged
against the normative public mandate to protect human dignity and the
common good of constitutional society.
From the nation's founding, thirteen years before the ratification of the
Constitution, the people asserted their sovereignty, equality, and inalienable
rights to "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness."1' 7 The political
philosophy of self-government, adopted into the Constitution, advances the
Declaration's demand that authority be used for the public good. This can
be done only where the individual is respected as a political and private
actor who can effectively participate in public policy through elections and
lobbying efforts. The Declaration makes clear the centrality of selfgovernment to nationhood. The very act of adopting the Declaration was
done in the name of "the Representatives of the united States of America"
under the "Authority of the good People of these Colonies,"' 18 not, as the
Confederate government wrongly claimed, by the authority of the states.
The Declaration explains that part of the cause for revolution was the
17.
18.

Id.para. 2.
Id. para. 32.
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King's refusal "to pass other Laws for the Accommodation of large
Districts of People, unless those People would relinquish the Right of
Representation in the Legislature." ' 19 The legislature was thought to be a
protector of the people's rights, which the King violated by, betimes,
20
dissolving colonial houses of representatives.
The Declaration committed the country to a republican government,
where people from all segments of the population could participate in selfgovernance, 2 1 empowered to create institutions for public safety and
happiness. 22 That statement of purpose translated into a variety of clauses
in the Constitution elaborating on the three branches' powers to operate for
the general welfare. 23 The later document was no mere restatement, but a
development and elaboration born from the experiences with the faulty
Articles of Confederation and the need for more robust national
government, 24 the powers of which extended to matters like interstate
25
commerce and taxing and spending for the general welfare.
Both the Declaration and Constitution assert that the fundamental
power of governance resides in the people. The cornerstone of government
provides the people with power over their destinies by retaining innate
individual entitlements and community standards for public actions. 26 The
Declaration posits that the people retain authority to organize government
27
according to principles most likely to secure their safety and happiness.
Contemporaries understood that the same "[s]ages, who penned the
19. Id. para. 5.
20. Id. para. 7.
21.
See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40-42, 74 (1986) (associating self-government with citizen
participation in political activity).
22. See Edmond N. Cahn, Madison and the Pursuit of Happiness, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 265
(1952) ("The thesis is that Madison's political philosophy of republicanism corresponds to the ethical
doctrines and convictions which are epitomized in a single phrase of the Declaration of Independence.
And the phrase is 'the pursuit of happiness."').
23. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
24. See William P. Marshall, National Healthcare and American Constitutional Culture, 35
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 145 (2012) ("One of the primary motivating concerns animating the
adoption of the Constitution was... that the Articles of Confederation created a national government
with insufficient authority to meet the demands of a burgeoning nation.").
25. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
26. See Speer v. Sch. Dirs., 50 Pa. 150, 160 (1865) ("The pursuit of happiness is our
acknowledged fundamental right, and that, therefore, which makes a whole community unhappy, is
certainly a social evil to be avoided if it can be.").
27. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("[W]henever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and
to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in
such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.").
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Declaration of Independence, laid it down, as a fundamental principle, that
28
government derives its just powers from the consent of the people alone."
One author, writing for a Philadelphia newspaper, asserted what had in
short order become common lore: "[i]t is a general maxim that government
was instituted for the protection and happiness of the people." 29 The
Constitution was actually a greater application of popular sovereignty than
the Declaration, since the public at large had not weighed in on the 1776
document before its passage, while constitutional conventions made up of
ordinary citizens, debated the text of the Constitution from 1787 to 1789.30
The Preamble to the Constitution asserts that government is created by the
people and is given authority to "promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. 3 1
The Declaration also announces the importance of an independent
judiciary. Take, for instance, the Declaration's condemnation of the British
monarchy for depriving Americans "of the Benefits of Trial by Jury." 3 2 The
Sixth and Seventh Amendments guarantee trial by jury.33 This entitlement
was so important that the colonists asserted jury trials to be essential even
before the Revolution. 34 In 1776, after the Declaration was issued, ordinary
commentators understood that trial by jury was a key component of the
unwritten Bill of Rights. 35 Independence from Great Britain, therefore,
meant much more than national sovereignty; to Americans, it implied the
ability to be judged by and to serve on a jury of their peers. The Sixth and
Seventh Amendments then adopted that concept and, adding to the
Declaration, made clear that the right to a jury trial applied to both civil and
criminal cases.
Judicial independence also appears in the Declaration. The colonists
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

American Intelligence, FREEMAN'S J. (Phila.), Aug. 24, 1791, at 2.
A Ploughman, To the People, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Oct. 5, 1782, at 1.
See American Intelligence, SALEM MERCURY, Apr. 7, 1789, at 2.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20.

33.
34.

U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
Even before the Declaration was drafted, the First Continental Congress had asserted that the

right to trial by jury was a colonial right. David L. Ammerman, The Tea Crisis andIts Consequences,
Through 1775, in A COMPANION TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 195, 198 (Jack P. Greene & J. R.
Pole eds., 2000). See also William Gordon, Forthe Independent Chronicle, Letter V. to the Inhabitants
of the Massachusetts-Bay, INDEP. CHRON. (Bos.), Oct. 3, 1776, at I (asserting that "Trial by Jury has

ever been deemed by Britons the palladium of liberty"). The Supreme Court, in Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227, 246 (1999), recognized that jury trials are woven into the fabric of U.S. citizenship.
35.

See, e.g., Casca, To the Freemen of Pennsylvania,PA. EVENING POST, Oct. 31, 1776, at 546

(stating that the unwritten Bill of Rights should "include the natural rights of every freeman, and the
essential principles of free government, such as liberty of conscience-annual elections-freedom of
the press-trial by jury-rotation of offices-equality of representation, &c.").
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accused King George III of diminishing judicial authority to prevent abuses
of power by making "Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of
their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries." 36 This abuse,
as Chief Justice John Roberts explained in a case that dealt with the scope
37
of bankruptcy court jurisdiction, encroached on judicial independence.
While the Declaration discusses this issue in the negative, as it does with
trial by jury, the Constitution addresses it in the positive. Under the
Constitution, judges are not subject to the will of the legislature or
president; rather, they "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."38 The
Constitution creates an entitlement for Article III judges to prevent the
wrongs identified in the Declaration. The prohibition against diminishing
compensation prevents the "master of the purse"39 from reducing judges'
against
compensations and thereby preserves their independence
40
encroachment by the other two branches of federal government.
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Until recently, the Supreme Court has shied away from the
Declaration in its constitutional interpretations. 41 However, the Court has
periodically signaled the relevance of the Declaration to constitutional
interpretation. 42 Except for a few forays into the subject, Justices'
references to it remain rare, somewhat ambiguous, and often relegated to
concurring or dissenting opinions. Nevertheless, those rare invocations
have betimes been powerfully framed. For instance, in a concurring
opinion, Justice Arthur J. Goldberg asserted, "[tihe Declaration of
Independence states the American creed., 43 That conception places the
Declaration at the very center of constitutional normativity. In this
framework, it is not only hortatory, but also a mandate for government to
safeguard the people's inalienable rights, human equality, and the dignified
opportunity to safely pursue personal happiness.
36.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11.

37. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011).
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
39. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531 (1933).
40. See id. (stating that the Declaration "foreshadowed" the constitutional prohibition against
diminishing judicial compensation).
41. Alexander Tsesis, Self-Government and the Declarationof Independence, 97 CORNELL L.
REv. 693, 699 (2012).
42. See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 219-20 (1901).
43. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 286 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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Clearer and more expositive judicial statements on the Declaration are
necessary to connect the document to a variety of precedents that recognize
human dignity has a substantive constitutional value. 44 Because "human
dignity" is not used in the Constitution, some commentators have attacked
holdings relying on that principle for lacking textual anchors. 45 The
Unalienable Rights Clause of the Declaration offers the logical locus for a
response. Relying on it in future opinions would help anchor dignity as a
constitutional entitlement.
The constitutionality of the Declaration's Pursuit of Happiness Clause
is on even firmer ground. The Court has explicitly-albeit rarely and in
passing-found it to be a substantive safeguard of liberty, holding, for
example, that it encompasses the right to parental autonomy. 46 In a
different opinion, which struck down a neutrally drafted municipal
ordinance that a city was administering in a discriminatory manner against
Chinese immigrants, 47 the Court recognized the Declaration's statement of
rights to be constitutionally protected: "fundamental rights to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are
secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments
showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings
of civilization under the reign ofjust and equal laws." 48
44. Of late, the Supreme Court has relied on, although never fully parsed, the relationship
between dignity and constitutional rights. Most recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015), the Court discussed human dignity without noticing that the Declaration of Independence
provides a clear guarantee of that interest. In a case dealing with procreation rights, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor stated that "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education" involve "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy." Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). Concurring in part in the case, Justice John Paul Stevens asserted
that "[t]he woman's constitutional liberty interest also involves her freedom to decide matters of the
highest privacy and the most personal nature." Id. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). In a separate case, in which the majority struck a state statute prohibiting intimate homosexual
contact, the Court reasoned that the statute had detrimental effects on human dignities. Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). Expounding on the dignity of marriage, the Court held that the history
and text of a federal statute defining marriage to be only between a man and a woman "demonstrate that
interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the
exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute." United
States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). Even limits on personal mobility, including legitimate
prison regulations, cannot violate "the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons." Brown v.
Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
45. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, A CriticalIntroduction to the OriginalismDebate, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 875, 882 (2008).
46. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that parental rights are
among those "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men").
47. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
48. Id. at 370.
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The "pursuit of Happiness" is not an empty phrase, but carries
meaning for those seeking to vindicate their rights.49 Lower state and
federal courts have generally understood the pursuit of happiness to refer to
a slew of fundamental rights, including the right to marry, 50 "to try to earn
a living," 5 1 and privacy. 52 Travel is also critical to a person's enjoyment
autonomy and happiness. The Court has recognized that
[the Privileges and Immunities Clause] gives [citizens] the right of free
ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in
other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in
the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of
happiness; and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of
their laws.

53

During the twentieth century, the Court developed an expansive
substantive due process doctrine that went well beyond "property. 54 In a
49. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the ConstitutionalJustice of Livelihood, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1115 (1986) ("In a constitutional universe admitting serious attention to the
Declaration of Independence, a malnourished child is not enjoying a 'right to the pursuit of
happiness."').
50. Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 64 F. Supp. 3d 906, 924 (S.D. Miss. 2014); State v.
Thompson, 782 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).
51.
Habron v. Epstein, 412 F. Supp. 256, 266 (D. Md. 1976) (Watkins, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
right to try to earn a living is a fundamental right, associated with the right to the pursuit of
happiness.").
52. Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544, 546
(Fla. 1985) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
53. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978) (emphasis added) (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869)). In a concurrence, Justice Joseph P. Bradley reversed this argument,
asserting that "property" encompassed the "pursuit of happiness."
By that portion of the fourteenth amendment by which no State may make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or take life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, it has now become the fundamental law of
this country that life, liberty, and property (which include "the pursuit of happiness") are
sacred rights, which the Constitution of the United States guarantees to its humblest citizen
against oppressive legislation, whether national or local, so that he cannot be deprived of them
without due process of law.
Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 136 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). In a dissent in a
different case, he equated "property" with "pursuit of happiness," noting that "[r]ights to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty, and property." Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (18 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
54. In developing a dynamic understanding of substantive due process, the Supreme Court has
examined "our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 710 (1997). Elsewhere, the Court spoke of the "emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 572 (2003). The Court has further explained the balancing intrinsic to court proceedings to identify
substantive liberties: "[i]n determining whether a substantive right protected by the Due Process Clause
has been violated, it is necessary to balance 'the liberty of the individual' and 'the demands of an
organized society."' Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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notable case, the Court identified the liberty to marry to have "long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men." 55 The pursuit of happiness is taken to be an
axiomatic right that was a component of the decision. Likewise, in a
landmark case adopting the right of substantive due process, the Court
identified that
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
recognized at common
56
happiness by free men.
As the Court came to understand the values encompassing substantive due
process, it found an axiomatic connection between the Declaration's
Pursuit of Happiness Clause and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'
guarantees of liberty.
Elsewhere, the Court has recognized that the right to privacy is not a
property right but is necessary for securing "conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness." 57 A heretofore unidentified link can be traced
between the unenumerated right of privacy, the Declaration, and the Bill of
Rights; the Declaration condemns the King for "quartering large Bodies of
Armed Troops among us," 58 and the Third Amendment of the Constitution
adopts the condemnation into an injunction against the quartering of
soldiers in any house at a time of peace without an owner's consent, or "in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." 59 The implications
of these two prohibitions against abuses of authority and the preservation of
personal space run deep. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the majority found
that the prohibition against quartering is a "facet of that privacy" that runs
throughout penumbras of the Bill of Rights. 60 Other provisions of the Bill
of Rights, such as the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against illegal
55. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
56. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See also Schwarzman v. Schwarzrnan, 388
N.Y.S.2d 993, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400).
57. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 166 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), was based on the Pursuit of Happiness Clause). See also Olmstead, 277
U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much broader
in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness.").
58.
59.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 16 (U.S. 1776).
U.S. CONST. amend. iI.

60.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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searches and seizures, 6 1 add to the penumbral source of the unenumerated
right to privacy that is implied in both documents.
The significance of this underlying commitment to preserve the right
to make characteristically volitional choices against intrusion by official
powers cannot be overstated. Beginning with the implied right to privacy,
the Court inductively inferred the right to privacy in matters of
reproductive autonomy 62 and sexual liberty. 63 The full implication of these
implied privacy statements was not evident to the framers; however, later
generations understood that the specific injunctions against certain uses of
governmental power, powerfully protected by the Unalienable Rights
Clause of the Declaration 64 and the Unenumerated Rights Clause of the
Ninth Amendment, 65 implied something deep about the enumerated
powers. The specifics in both documents were starting points; the more
general provisions gave each succeeding generation the space to construct
constitutional meaning with greater refinement.
In its most recent term, the Supreme Court demonstrated a greater
willingness to draw on the Declaration for meaning of constitutional selfgovernment.

In

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent

Redistricting Commission, writing for the majority, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg recognized that sovereignty over representative legislation
remains in the hands of the people. 66 "Our Declaration of Independence,
2, drew from Locke in stating: 'Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the govemed."' 67 This
potentially important interpretive development was dulled, however,
because the opinion lacked any clear statement about how lower court
judges should regard the Declaration in future cases.
Justice Ginsburg relied on the quoted historical point to support her
holding that the people are guaranteed a role in lawmaking, including the
ability to check abuses by legislators and to participate in drawing the
borders of federal congressional districts.6 8 One of the most important
unanswered questions is whether the Declaration can be used to help judges
arrive at substantive holdings or only to develop reasoning in dicta. A more
61. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
63. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (recognizing a right to sexual privacy for
adults in same-sex relationships).
64.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

65.
66.
67.
68.

U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S.Ct. 2652, 2675 (2015).
Id.
Id.
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robust message is needed from the Court, one that recognizes the
Declaration as part of our constitutional law and relevant in matters
involving government structures, civil rights, representative democracy,
and the public trust.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion leaves uncertain how and whether the
Declaration can be distinguished from other historical documents such as
John Locke's Two Treatises of Government, which she cited alongside the
Declaration. 69 The duty to safeguard the liberty and equality of persons is
not simply a philosophical construct but a constitutional obligation.70
Violation of that principle renders any law-be it the Three-Fifths Clause
or a state segregation law-violative of the foundational structure of U.S.
democracy. The Declaration's statements about individual rights place
certain obligations on government to create institutions and regulations
likely to empower the people to pursue their unique visions of happiness.
The Declaration is not merely idealistic, but pregnant with heuristic value
for decisionmakers. Moreover, unlike historical treatises by influential
theorists like Locke, the Declaration was officially adopted by an organ of
the United States as a statement of national purpose and independence. The
specific and general terms of the Declaration establish certain mandates
that are so binding on public servants that the people retain the right to
abolish despotic governments. 71 There is certainly no similar right to
abolish a government that is committed to Lockean social contract ideas.
Just as Justice Ginsburg recognized the structural value of the
Declaration to democratic self-representation, Justice Clarence Thomas,
writing a dissent to a different case, added an understanding about the
Declaration's mandate of human dignity. He disagreed with the Court's
ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges that "the right to marry is a fundamental
right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. 72 Justice
Thomas believed the majority had rejected "the idea-captured in our
Declaration of Independence-that human dignity is innate and suggests
73
instead that it comes from the Government.
Justice Thomas was certainly correct that the foundations of rights in
the Constitution are predicated on the innate human dignity asserted in the
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Declaration. 74 As he stated, those held in slavery certainly retained their
dignities despite their torments. 75 The same could be said about Japanese
citizens retaining their dignity rights, despite the oppression of World
War II internment.
Much as Justice Thomas was correct about the normative value of the
Declaration, he failed to notice that James Obergefell's claim to the dignity
to marry could have been based on the Declaration's statement of innate
rights, incorporated through the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
Had Justice Thomas reflected on the relevance of the Declaration to
Obergefell's claim for marriage equality, he might have balanced
Obergefell's interests against other dignitary interests involved, which he
seems to think are the dignities of persons who voted against marriage
equality, 76 and also scrutinized the strength and fit of public interests in
legally secure marriages. This type of balanced scrutiny would have likely
identified the invidious discrimination of refusing to recognize Obergefell's
claim of equal rights as the surviving spouse. Instead, Justice Thomas's
opinion curiously ignored the clear pertinence of the Declaration's general
statement of innate rights to the equal enjoyment of marriage. Even though
the Declaration's protection of human dignity is squarely on point with
Obergefell's constitutional claim, Justice Thomas paid it no attention.
The Supreme Court's uses of the Declaration have, therefore, been
uncommon and irregular. When the Court has found it relevant to
constitutional interpretation, the document has only provided some
preliminary guidance; further expansion is necessary to reflect more fully
the Declaration's interpretive value.
C. NORMS AND A REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
The normative and structural similarities between the Constitution and
Declaration indicate the extent to which the earlier document influenced
the cultural, political, and legal memes about just government within which
74. While the term "human dignity" is not used in the Declaration, it is certainly an accurate
statement of present-day meaning, given international human rights instruments. Furthermore, while it
was unfortunate that Justice Thomas used the term to defend gender inequality in marriage, he probably
captured the correct understanding of original meaning because, by 1776, "human dignity" had been in
common use for over a century, appearing in well-known works such as John Milton's 1645
Tetrachordon.See, e.g., JOHN MILTON, TETRACHORDON: EXPOSITIONS UPON THE FOURE CHIEF PLACES
IN SCRIPTURE, WHICH TREAT OF MARIAGE, OR NULLITIES IN MARIAGE 32 (London, s.n. 1645). The

term was also in common use in colonial writings. See, e.g., Entertainment,N.Y. MERCURY, Jan. 1,
1753, at 1.
75.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
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the framers worked. The documents are congruous in their presentation of a
structure of government beneficial to the people and aimed at the public
good. As the foundational statement of national principle, the Declaration
speaks of "all Men" being "created equal,.., endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness." 77 Integrating this statement with the safeguard in the
Constitution's Preamble for the general welfare creates a dual obligation of
private and public mindedness: government is instituted by the people to
safeguard individual and public efforts to live freely and happily. It
constitutes a full-throated condemnation of oppression against equal,
natural liberties.
The doctrine of inalienable rights continues to be a constructive
ideation of national government because of the value of humanity it
espouses, not because the framers adopted it. Their own prejudices need
not weigh down the construction of its text. The recognition of inalienable
human rights is not confined to any particular group, but asserted in
universal terms. Being members of the human family, each person is an
equal in relation to others and in the eyes of the law. This doctrine
comprises the essential facet of American republicanism. The sine qua non
of state power is the maintenance of a legal scheme that is "likely to effect
[the people's] Safety and Happiness."7 8
By 1776, Americans generally believed that a republican government
was necessary to safeguard natural rights. The Declaration provides a
simple catalogue of some of those natural rights-life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness-that were thought to be equally and innately shared
by all humans. 79 To the civic world in the period between adoption of the
Declaration and ratification of the Constitution, "a truly Republican
empire" meant, "[a]ll mankind should by their natural rights, enjoy equal
liberty, except in such cases which tend to the injury of their neighbours;
therefore they should have a government endued with sufficient power, to
check the progress of the wicked and to protect the virtuous." 8 The
commitment to republican government conceived of a people with mutual
interests, linked by the desire to achieve a common good by constituting
government.8 ' Put into historical relief, the Declaration is a mixed
77.
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78.
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79.

See FOUNDING THE REPUBLIC: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 37-38 (John J. Patrick ed., 1995).

80. Foreigner, To the Opposers of the Federal Constitution, Number I, INDEP. GAZETrEER
(Phila.) Nov. 2, 1787, at 2.
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statement guaranteeing inalienable rights and the people's authority, and
prohibiting illegitimate uses of authority. Even before the Constitution
came into operation, contemporaries understood that independence had
created a republican form of government, the legislators of which were
obligated to abide by principles conducive to constituents' liberties. 82 The
close relationship between country and structure of government was clearly
stated by the selectmen of Marblehead, New York to the visiting George
Washington: "The blessings of independence and a republican government
must ever excite our gratitude and affection to so eminent a supporter of the
public liberty, whose wisdom and valor have so successfully defended the
rights of his country. 83
II. CONSTITUTION AND RECONSTRUCTION
A. ILLEGITIMATE COMPROMISE

If the premise is correct that the Declaration set the mandatory
aspiration for national government and the Constitution set the mechanisms
for its administration, then the earlier document retained its authority, even
after ratification. Yet contrary to the Declaration's premises, the
Constitution set express barriers against the universal enjoyment of innate
human rights. What is more, as the great abolitionist Frederick Douglass
pointed out, the Constitution was internally contradictory because the
clauses protecting slavery violated the Preamble; 84 that evil institution was
incompatible with the Preamble's general statement of the "Blessings of
Liberty" for which "We the People" ordained and established a
85
Constitution for the United States.
Several clauses of the Constitution structurally protected the
institution of slavery. The Importation Clause prohibited Congress from
abolishing international slave trading prior to 1808.86 The Three-Fifths
Clause enabled the South to increase its political power beyond the persons
welfare of the people comprehensible was the assumption that the people.., were a homogenous
body .... Since everyone in the community was linked organically to everyone else, what was good for
the whole community was ultimately good for all the parts.").
82.
See, e.g., Copy of a Letter from Frederick, March 14, 1787, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER,
Mar. 30, 1787, at 2; Philadelphia,April 22, N.Y. DAILY GAZETTE, Apr. 30, 1789, at 422.
83.
Selectmen of Marblehead, United States, N.Y. PACKET, Dec. 15, 1789, at 2.

84.

Frederick Douglass, Oath to Support the Constitution, N. STAR (Rochester), Apr. 5, 1850,

reprinted in GLENN M. LINDEN, VOICES FROM THE GATHERING STORM: THE COMING OF THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 40,40-41 (2001).
85.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.

86.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
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87
capable of voting in elections or truly represented in Congress.
Congress's power to call up the militia in order to "suppress insurrections"
granted legislators the power to put down slave rebellions. 88 The Fugitive
Clause was understood to empower Congress to pass necessary and proper
laws for the return of runaway slaves. 89 And Article V, which requires twothirds of both congressional houses to propose an amendment and threefourths of state legislatures or conventions to ratify it, 90 made it impossible
prior to the Civil War to propose any changes to the Constitution adverse to
slavery.

Slavery was the original Constitution's greatest downfall because it
violated the constitutional principle of inalienable, equal human rights.
Clauses meant to shield slavery were at odds with the most basic concept of
republican government. So internally incongruous were the nation's
binding ideals from slavery-protecting portions of the original Constitution
that the friction eventually led to the Civil War, which became a battle for
the unity of constitutional values. In 1787, a foreign observer remarked,
"Though the federal power should not interfere in the internal-management
of the states; yet some extraordinary affairs demand an exception." 9 1 He
referred specifically to maintenance of "negro slavery," arguing that
bringing about its demise should be "a federal object ....A man who
exercises absolute power over some hundred fellow creatures, although he
should not abuse it, cannot easily have a heart-felt sensibility of the equal
rights of mankind, the moderation of a republican, and a genuine love of
liberty." 92

Contrary to the claims of a
revolutionary generation understood
maxims of the Declaration. Writing
slavery for being "inconsistent

variety of historians, 93 many in the
that slavery was incompatible with the
in 1776, a British attorney condemned
with all ideas of justice" and a

3. Article II, Section I, Clause 2 granted each state presidential
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
electors whose numbers were equal to the state's combined number of senators and representatives. U.S.
2. Those added electors were essential in securing Thomas Jefferson's election
CONST. art. II, § 1., el.
over John Adams in the 1800 presidential election. Paul Finkelman, The Color of Law, 87 Nw. U. L.
REV. 937, 971 (1993) (reviewing ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992)).
88.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.15.

89.

3.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.

90.

U.S. CONST. art. V.

91. An Essay on the Means of PromotingFederalSentiments in the United States, by a Foreign
Spectator, INDEP. GAZETTER (Phila.), Sept. 17, 1787, at 2.
92. Id.
93.
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"crime... [that is] monstrous against the human species." 94 Continuing in
words closely resembling the Declaration, he asserted that slavery was "no
little, indirect attack upon the safety and happiness of our fellow creatures,
95
but one that boldly strikes at the foundation of all humanity and justice."
Five years after the adoption of the Declaration, the great American
abolitionist Anthony Benezet relied on the Declaration's statement that "all
Men are created equal" and endowed with the rights to "Life, Liberty, and
the pursuit of Happiness" 96 when he stated that the Declaration established
national moral commitments that "apply to human nature in general,
however diversified by colour and other distinctions."97 Even earlier, in
1778, Benezet wrote that the Declaration was a binding resolution of the
national recognition of rights and should be read as a condemnation
"against the slavery of the Negroes." 9 8 In April 1787, a month before the
Constitutional Convention met, a Pennsylvanian abolitionist society
petitioned for the end of slavery on the basis of the "truth" founded by "the
Act of Independence." 99 A pastor in New Haven, Connecticut relied on the
second paragraph of the Declaration in a sermon condemning racial
slavery.' 00 A similar idea appears in a 1793 petition by a Delawarean
Quaker, Warner Mifflin. Quoting the same portion of the document, he
condemned the "despotic tyranny" of augmenting power by suppressing
"helpless victims" by means of "enslaving and exercising an imperious
lordship."' '
Later abolitionists picked up this theme but were more adamant in
their condemnation of the Constitution for adopting provisions directly
opposed to the principles of 1776. Theodore Parker, who hid fugitive slaves
but did not live to see constitutional abolition, noted that the Declaration's
94. Letter from Thomas Day (1776), in Fragment of an Original Letter on the Slavery of the
Negroes, FREEMAN'S J. (Phila.), Sept. 8, 1784, at 2.
95. Id.
96. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
97. ANTHONY BENEZET, SHORT OBSERVATIONS ON SLAVERY 2 (Phila., Joseph Crukshank
1781).
98.

ANTHONY BENEZET, SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 28

(Phila., Joseph Crukshank 1778).
99. PA. ABOLITION SoC'Y, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY, FOR
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BONDAGE 21 (Phila., Francis Bailey 1788).
100. James Dana, Pastor, First Cong. Church in New Haven, The African Slave Trade: A
Discourse, Address Before the Connecticut Society for the Promotion of Freedom (Sept. 9, 1790), in
DOCTOR DANA'S SERMON ON THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE 28 (New Haven, Thomas & Samuel Green

1790).
101.
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assertion of the people's right to create a government "which shall secure
their safety and happiness" never mentioned color. 10 2 William Lloyd
Garrison, an uncompromising advocate of immediate abolition, famously
branded the Constitution "a covenant with death, and an agreement with
hell."' 1 3 In contrast, Garrison praised the Declaration of Independence's
statement about "human equality and freedom."' 1 4 Contrary to the banner
of "the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence," Garrison
asserted in another speech, "to swear to support the Constitution of the
United States, as it is, is to make 'a compromise between right and wrong,'
and to wage war against human liberty. It is to recognize and honor as
republican legislators, incorrigible men-stealers, MERCILESS TYRANTS,
BLOODTHIRSTY ASSASSINS .... "'O Remaining true to his message,

Garrison time and again charged that "the present national compact ...was
formed at the expense of human liberty, by a profligate surrender of
principle." 10 6 The American Anti-Slavery Society, of which he was
president, argued that it was "unlawful for freemen to take the oath of
10 7
allegiance" to the Constitution because it favored slavery and oligarchy.
He was certainly not the only one to hold that sentiment; many abolitionists
spoke of the Declaration in the context of republican governance and the
"cruel, unjust and unreasonable distinction" made "against the color of the
skin."'' 08 Abolitionists built on a tradition of debate consistent with the
Declaration's assertion that government must be adapted to the people's
safety and happiness, 10 9 but added to it, condemning slaveholding on the
102. Theodore Parker, The Relation of Slavery to a Republican Form of Government, Address
Before the New England Anti-Slavery Convention (May 26, 1858), in THE RELATION OF SLAVERY TO A
REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT: A SPEECH 13 (Boston, William L. Kent & Co. 1858).
103. The Meeting at Framingham, LIBERATOR (Bos.), July 7, 1854, at 106 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The assertion that the Constitution was "a covenant with death, and an agreement with
hell" was not new to abolitionists. See, e.g., Alonzo P. Jaques, Our Inhuman Religion, LIBERATOR
(Bos.), Dec. 23, 1842, at 202.
104. The Meeting at Framingham,supranote 103, at 106.
105. William Lloyd Garrison, Address to the Friendsof Freedom and Emancipation in the United
States, LIBERATOR (Bos.), May 31, 1844, at 86.
106. William Lloyd Garrison, President, Exec. Comm. of the Am. Anti-Slavery Soc'y, Address to
the Friends of Freedom and Emancipation in the United States (May 20, 1844), in 12 ANTI-SLAVERY
EXAMINER 3, 4 (1845).
107. Id.
108. Anecdote, LIBERATOR (Bos.), Aug. 13, 1831, at 131 (quoting a letter to the editor from the
editor of the Worcester Yeoman). See also Constitution of the American Anti-Slavery Society,
LIBERATOR (Bos.), Jan. 11, 1834, at 5; Lane Seminary: Important Anti-Slavery Document, LIBERATOR
(Bos.), Jan. 3, 1835, at 3.
109. See, e.g., Ass'n of Christian Ministers, To the Public, PA. PACKET, Jan. 21, 1788, at 3; John
Hancock, A Proclamation,for a Day of Public Thanksgiving, MASS. GAZETTE, Nov. 2, 1787, at 2;
George Washington, By the Presidentof the United States of America: A Proclamation,N.Y. PACKET,
Oct. 15, 1789, at 3.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 89:369

basis of universal principles.
Another group of immediatist abolitionists, known as the Radical
Abolitionists, argued that slavery was prohibited by the Declaration and
unprotected by the Constitution. For instance, Lysander Spooner, in The
Unconstitutionalityof Slavery, wrote that the Constitution in no way denied
the self-evident truth that all men "have a natural and inalienable right to
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."' 10 Because the Declaration was
meant to end slavery and the Constitution nowhere specifically mentions
slavery, Spooner argued that the nation's founding documents did not
create the institution, despite contrary practices."' Another Radical
Abolitionist, Gerrit Smith, wrote that the Constitution and the Articles of
Confederation could only derive their authority from the Declaration. From
this premise, Smith drew the following conclusion: "[T]he Declaration of
Independence is the very soul of every legitimate American Constitutionthe Constitution of Constitutions-the Law of Laws .... [I]f there was
legal slavery in this land before the Declaration of Independence was
adopted, there, nevertheless, could be none after."" 2 He admitted that those
men who had adopted the Declaration had brought the document into
disrepute by allowing slavery to expand, but argued that they expected the
institution to die, shrivel up, and vanish shortly after independence, 13
When placed side by side with provisions of the Constitution that
Southerners and Northerners regarded to protect slavery, the Radical
Abolitionists' arguments were unconvincing to the vast majority of
congressmen and judges. 4 Ending the institution and empowering the
federal government to act in accordance with the universal values of the
Declaration would require formal constitutional change.
B. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DECLARATION'S IDEAL
Those who claimed that the terms of the Declaration were included in
the original Constitution had to gainsay the presumption that the latter
superseded the ideals of 1776.115 For example, it could be said that the
110. LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 44 (Bos., Bela Marsh 1845).
111. See id. at 66-70.
112. Representative Gerrit Smith, Speech on the Nebraska Bill (Apr. 6, 1854), in SPEECHES OF
GERRIT SMITH IN CONGRESS 113, 130-31 (N.Y.C., Mason Bros. 1856).
113. See id. at 132, 135-36.
114.
See WENDELL PHILLIPS, REVIEW OF LYSANDER SPOONER'S ESSAY ON THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 75 (Bos., Andrews & Prentiss 1847) (reviewing SPOONER, supra

note 110) (stating that Lysander Spooner's work claimed "the Supreme Court is authorized to set free
the slaves in the several states" and concluding that his arguments were "utterly weak, fanciful and
unsound").
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Fifth Amendment's prohibition against depriving anyone of "life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law"' 16 had some of the same elements
as the Unalienable Rights Clause's safeguards for "Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness," 117 but "Happiness" is more sweeping in its
implication than "property." One available reply was that the Declaration
and Constitution were consistent with each other: While the "Happiness"
provision was not included in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, it was implied there. 18 Others argued the right to pursue
happiness was articulated by the Unenumerated Rights Clause of the Ninth
Amendment 1 9 or the General Welfare Clause of the Preamble. 120 By the
time of the Civil War, however, politicians came to understand that the
Declaration's principles needed to be placed on firmer constitutional
ground than they had been at the nation's founding.
The ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments incorporated the
second paragraph of the Declaration into the Constitution. The original
Constitution's compromises with slavery had deviated from the
Declaration's universal principles. Concessions the founders had made for
the sake of national union delayed the possibility of forming an egalitarian
republic, where every person could enjoy the pursuit of inalienable rights
and the general welfare of stable government. Instead, the country became
a racial oligarchy, where slavery and many forms of injustice were
diametrically opposed to the nation's founding statement of purpose.
Only during the course of the Civil War did the opponents of slavery
gain sufficient congressional influence to put an end to the institution
lawyer and former senator from Massachusetts, who in the 1850s derided efforts to end slavery. Choate
castigated anti-slavery politics for being predicated on premises extraneous to the Constitution, dubbing
them "the glittering and sounding generalities of natural right which make up the Declaration of
Independence." Letter from Rufus Choate to E. W. Farley, Aug. 9, 1856, in 1 SAMUEL GILMAN
BROWN, THE WORKS OF RUFUS CHOATE WITH A MEMOIR OF His LIFE (1862). For the general canon of

supplementary interpretive construction, see City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 347
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting.).
116. U.S. CONST. amend V.
117.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

118. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See G. W. F. MELLEN, AN ARGUMENT ON THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 410 (1841) (connecting the Pursuit of Happiness Clause to
portions of the Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause).
119. For the nineteenth century argument that the Declaration established a beneficent
government prohibited from interfering with enumerated rights, see For the U.S. Telegraph, reprinted
in POLITICAL REGISTER 570, 576 (D.C., Duff Green 1832) and J. G. Hertwig, Religious Liberty, 3 AM.
J. POL. 430, 431 (1893).
120. U.S. CONST. pmbl. For an example of a nineteenth century statement connecting the
Declaration and the Preamble to the Constitution, see THOMAS POWER, AN ORATION DELIVERED BY
REQUEST OF THE CITY AUTHORITIES, BEFORE THE CITY OF BOSTON ON THE SIXTY FOURTH
ANNIVERSARY OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, JULY 4, 1840, at 24 (Bos., John H. Eastburn 1840).
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through constitutional amendment. Advocacy for passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment began to build after Lincoln issued his Emancipation
Proclamation on January 1, 1863. That same year, the National Convention
of German Radicals announced their chief aim to be the "[a]bolition of
slavery... [and r]evision of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration
of Independence."' 121 They considered the "[p]roclamation of equal human
rights by the Declaration of Independence" to be "the only true
fundamental law of republican life."' 122 Similarly, about two months after
the Thirteenth Amendment had been introduced in Congress by
Representative James M. Ashley of Ohio, 123 the Freedom Convention met
in Louisville and adopted a resolution on the need to amend the
Constitution to end slavery in order "to secure freedom to every person" in
keeping with "the principles of freedom announced by the Declaration of
Independence and the Federal Constitution.' ' 124 Garrison's Liberator
asserted that by superseding the proslavery clauses of the Constitution,
"[s]uch an amendment.., will give completeness and permanence to
emancipation, and bring the Constitution into avowed harmony with the
25
Declaration of Independence."']
The Abolitionists' sentiments were shared by many in Congress, who
understood the Reconstruction Amendments to incorporate the
Declaration's fundamental principle of equal inalienable rights. Senator
John P. Hale of New Hampshire called on his fellow citizens to "wake up
to the meaning of the sublime truths" that the nation's "fathers uttered
years ago and which have slumbered dead letters upon the pages of our
126
Constitution, of our Declaration of Independence, and of our history."'
"Our ancestors," asserted Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri, had
paved the way to civil war by hypocritically preserving their own
"inalienable right of liberty unto all men," and "came to refuse it to others"
27
under the guise of expedience.'
Participants in the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment made clear
121.
The German Radical Convention, CLEVELAND DAILY HERALD, Oct. 24, 1863, at 3.
122. Id.
123. Representative Ashley introduced the proposal for the Thirteenth Amendment on December
14, 1863. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1863). Representative John Henderson of Missouri
introduced the proposal on January 13, 1864. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1864).
124. The EasternNews: To-day's Dispatches, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F.), Feb. 25, 1864, at 2.
125.
Universal Emancipation, LIBERATOR (Bos.), May 6, 1864, at 1 (reprinting an extract from an
April 8, 1864 speech delivered in the United States Senate by Senator Charles Sumner of
Massachusetts).
126. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1443 (1864) (statement of Sen. John P. Hale).
127. Id. at 1461 (statement of Sen. John B. Henderson).
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that the modification to the Constitution would grant Congress the power to
pass civil rights legislation in keeping with the principles of the
Declaration. The Head of the House Judiciary Committee, Representative
James F. Wilson of Iowa, believed the Thirteenth Amendment would create
power in the federal government that would be inspired by the
revolutionary proclamation of "human equality" drawn from the "sublime
creed" of the Declaration. 128 In the reformed nation, "equality before the
law [was] to be the great corner-stone" that the states and the judiciary
would be unable to undermine. 129 Representative Isaac N. Arnold of
Illinois called for "incorporating into our organic law the glorious
prohibition of slavery" directly from the Declaration. 130 Likewise, a
meeting of the Southern Loyal Convention called for the South and North
to unite "under the roof of the time-honored hall, in which the Declaration
of [I]ndependence... inspires us with the animating hope that the
principles of just and equal government which were made the foundation of
the republic at its origin, shall become the cornerstone of the
Constitution."'131
A common thread among many groups supporting constitutional
abolition was how it would more clearly incorporate the Declaration's
humanistic principles into the Constitution. While most debates occurred
on the stage of national politics, the significance of the Thirteenth
Amendment was not lost on an international audience. An attorney from
Manchester, England wrote a friend in support of ratifying the
constitutional amendment to abolish slavery: "Then will your first great
Declaration of Independence become indeed a solid, enduring, noble
132 He continued
REALITY, securing freedom as the birthright of all men."
that returning to the nation's founding principles would help secure liberty
as the human birthright to go hand-in-hand with "the precious heritage of
liberty-equal rights and privileges of citizenship. 133 The great
philosopher John Stuart Mill wrote a letter from England to a friend calling
for ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment and the necessity "to break
altogether the power of the slaveholding caste" as necessary for "the
opening words of the Declaration of Independence" to no longer be "a
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 1319 (statement of Rep. James F. Wilson).
Id. at 2989 (statement of Rep. Isaac N. Arnold).
Id. (statement of Rep. Isaac N. Arnold).

131.

Resolutions of the Southern Loyal Convention, VT. WATCHMAN & ST. J., Sept. 14, 1866, at 1.

132.

Letter from Thomas H. Barker to William Lloyd Garrison (Mar. 4, 1865), in Letter from

Thomas H. Barker, Esq., LIBERATOR (Bos.), Mar. 31, 1865, at 50.

133.

Id.
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' 134
reproach to the nation founded by its authors."

Congressional supporters for ending slavery by amendment had no
doubt about the need for constitutional change. For them, Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney's claim that the Declaration applied only to whites was a
figment of his erroneous account of history and emaciated view of national
citizenship in Dred Scott.135 Contrary to Chief Justice Taney, Republican
leaders, especially those in the Radical Republican camp, believed the
Declaration "must be heeded," having been "whispered into the ears of this
nation since first we pronounced life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
to be the inalienable rights of all men."'136 Awakening to "true and real life
the moral sense of the nation," the people would undo those sections of the
Constitution that were "anti-republican." 137 A Maryland representative to
the House, speaking in Chicago, saw constitutional abolition to be a critical
step in formulating a government under which "colored people" would
have access to the ballot box and stated that "[t]hen all the principles of the
Declaration of Independence will be executed; this government will rest on
the rights of individual liberty and the right of every man to bear a share in
138
the government of the country."'
The connection between abolition and representative government was
also clearly stated in contemporaneous statutes enabling the people of the
territories of Nevada and Colorado to adopt a constitution and join the
Union. Congressional conditions for the states to gain admission included
134. John Stuart Mill, Bos. DAILY ADVERTISER, June 8, 1865, at 2 (reprinting an excerpt of a
letter written by John Stuart Mill) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). In his judgment, Chief Justice Taney
brashly claimed that when the Declaration was adopted and the Constitution was ratified, persons of the
"negro African race" were "considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race." Id.at 404-05, 406. Blacks were so unfit for association with whites
that "they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." Id.at 407.
Abraham Lincoln regarded Dred Scott as a departure from the nation's core values. Lincoln
proclaimed that Chief Justice Taney's judgment did "obvious violence to the plain, unmistakable
language of the Declaration." ABRAHAM LINCOLN, From His Speech on the Dred Scott Decision,
Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in SPEECHES AND LETTERS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1832-1865, at

61, 66 (Merwin Roe ed., 1919). He further asserted that the framers' structural outline was still binding:
I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men, but they did not
intend to declare all men equal in all respects ....They meant to set up a standard maxim for
free society, which should be familiar to all and revered by all,--constantly looked to,
constantly laboured for, and, even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated,
and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness
and value of life to all people of all colours everywhere.
Id.
136. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (statement of Rep. James F. Wilson).
137.
Id.at 1200 (statement of Rep. James F. Wilson).
138. Henry Winter Davis on Negro Suffrage, VT. WATCHMAN & ST. J., July 14, 1865, at 2
(intemal quotation marks omitted).
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the requirement that their constitutions be "republican, and not repugnant to
the constitution of the United States, and the principles of the Declaration
of Independence."' 139 This provision was further defined, in part, to require
Nevada and Colorado to prohibit slavery. 140 It showed how ending the
peculiar institution, republican governance, the values of the Declaration,
14 1
and constitutional change had become interwoven after the Civil War.
Radical Republicans, who in 1864 and 1865 held leadership positions
on several prominent congressional committees, 142 believed the freedom
amendment would put into effect the "spirit of our fathers" who had been
careful not to "introduce any discrimination of color" into the Declaration,
Articles of Confederation, or the Constitution. 143 During congressional
debates on the Fourteenth Amendment,' 44 Representative William Windom
of Minnesota argued that the Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth
Amendment granted Congress the power to pass civil rights law "to give
145
practical effect to the principles of the Declaration of Independence."'
This sentiment left no doubt that Representative Windom considered the
Declaration to be of substantive value to constitutional governance.
According to Representative John L. Thomas, Jr. of Maryland, by enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, with its prohibitions of discrimination in
contractual agreements and property ownerships, Congress had "for the
first time in the history of this Government," made "good the averment in
the Declaration of Independence that-'All men are endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness." ' 146 These and other statements, such as those of
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, about the power of Congress to
pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866 pursuant to Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment, were widely understood to increase national legislative
authority to enforce laws needed "to establish equality of civil rights in all
the States" in keeping with the Declaration of Independence's universal
139. Colorado Enabling Act of 1864, Pub. L. No. 38-37, § 4, 13 Stat. 32, 33; Nevada Enabling
Act of 1864, Pub. L. No. 38-36, § 4, 13 Stat. 30, 31.
140. Colorado Enabling Act § 4; Nevada Enabling Act § 4.
141. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 734 (1866) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
142. Alexander Tsesis, Principled Governance: The American Creed and Congressional
Authority, 41 CONN. L. REv. 679, 706 n.165 (2009).
143. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2246 (1864) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner). See
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 569-71 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull).
144. Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio first raised the Fourteenth Amendment in Congress
on January 9, 1866. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866) (statement of Rep. John A.
Bingham).
145. Id.at1159 (statement of Rep. William Windom).
146. Id.at 2094 (statement of Rep. John L. Thomas, Jr.).
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statements. 147
When it came time to debate passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the sentiments were symmetrical with those expressed about the Thirteenth
Amendment. Speaking on the floor of the House, Representative Shelby M.
Cullom of Illinois advocated passing the Fourteenth Amendment to achieve
the culmination of those "self-evident" truths "our fathers" included in the
Declaration and the Constitution, which together proclaimed the
"paramount objects of govemment"--being "[u]nion, justice, domestic
tranquility, the general welfare, the securement of the blessings of liberty to
themselves and their posterity." 148 Cullom expressed the mainstream view
in 1866 that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to set the Constitution
aright with the premises of the Declaration. Representative George F.
Miller of Pennsylvania also spoke in this vein, contending that no one
could object to Section l's prohibition against depriving persons of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, which was "so clearly
within the spirit of the Declaration of Independence."' 149 The Citizenship
Clause, as Indiana Lieutenant Governor Conrad Baker said in an extensive
speech in favor of ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, would entitle all
citizens equally to enjoy their natural rights
which are defined.., by our own Declaration of Independence, to be the
right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. And it is just because
the rebels in the South and their allies in the North, destroy these natural
men by State legislation that this amendment has
and absolute rights of
150
become a necessity.

Contemporaries perceived the Fourteenth Amendment to directly empower
federal government to safeguard the human entitlements declared in the
nation's statement of purpose.
For many congressmen, like Representative John F. Farnsworth of
Illinois, universal suffrage was needed to put in practice the Declaration's
self-evident truths about republican government. 15 1 The key to selfgovernment was that "all persons, negroes included.. . shall be admitted to
a participation in the Government, to a voice in the management of public
affairs" in "observance of the principles of the Declaration of
147.
Id. at 1228 (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
148.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 253 (1866) (statement of Rep. Shelby M. Cullom).
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1stSess. 2510 (1866) (statement of Rep. George F. Miller).
149.
150. A Great Union Meeting of Daviess and Knox Counties, at Wheatland-Speech of Lieutenant
Governor Baker on the First Section of the ConstitutionalAmendment-It Does Not Confer the Right of
Suffrage, INDIANAPOLIS DAILY J., Aug. 15, 1866, at 2.
151.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2539 (1866) (statement of Rep. John F. Farnsworth).
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Independence."' 5 2 For those like Senator Richard Yates of Illinois, who
regarded the Reconstruction Amendments to be national statements of
human rights, disenfranchisement on the basis of race was illegitimate. The
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were realizations of "the surest way
by which we shall accomplish our purpose... to assert that which the
Constitution of the United States meant to assert. It meant to assert the
principles of the Declaration of American Independence."' 53 Senator
Sumner forcefully and emotionally asserted in support of the Fifteenth
Amendment that it would restore the safeguards of equal political and civil
rights "which by the Declaration of Independence, and repeated texts of the
national Constitution, are under the safeguard of the nation" against local
prejudices.' 54 The widespread sentiment perceived the end of racial
discrimination at the ballot box to be essential "to put the great words of
the Declaration of Independence in the Constitution itself.''155 Incoming
Vermont Governor Peter Washburn echoed national sentiments in his
inaugural address to the state House of Representatives. Washburn asserted
that
[adoption of] the proposed Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States ... [would] give reality in fact to the truth enunciated

in the Declaration of Independence, and incorporated into the
will
Constitution of Vermont, that 'all men are created equal,' and 56
preserve inviolate the public faith pledged to the National freedmen. 1
Incorporation of the Declaration was the only way to live up to the
founding statements of republican government committed to the people's
sovereignty for the protection of their inalienable, equal rights.
152. Id. at 3525 (statement of Sen. Willard Saulsbury) (mocking those congressmen who believed
that the Declaration was tied to universal suffrage).
153. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1004 (1869) (statement of Sen. Richard Yates). For a
similarly nationalistic understanding of the Declaration of Independence and its applicability to
suffrage, see id. at 93 (statement of Rep. Benjamin F. Whittemore).
154. Id. at 902 (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
155. Id. at 725 (Statement of Rep. Glenni W. Scofield). See also id. at 652 (statement of Rep.
Shelby M. Cullom).
156. Peter T. Washburn, Vt. Governor, Inaugural Address (Oct. 16, 1869) (transcript available at
the Vermont Secretary of State website), https://www.sec.state.vt.us/media/49078/Washbuml869.pdf
(last visited Feb. 21, 2016). The governor of Missouri made a similar statement to his state's senate the
day prior to his state's ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. See also JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF
MISSOURI AT THE ADJOURNED SESSION OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 26 (Jefferson

City, Horace Wilcox 1870) (asserting that "humanity and good faith in vindicating the truth that 'all
men are created equal"' required ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment).
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CONCLUSION

The Declaration of Independence set republican principles for selfgovernance. Those ideals existed in the American legal ethos from the
nation's founding and were later interpolated into the Constitution through
the Reconstruction Amendments. Even in the original Constitution, a
variety of clauses are parallel to paragraphs of the Declaration. More
importantly, the Constitution built institutions for achieving the
representative structure set out in the Declaration. The great failing of the
original Constitution was the inclusion of clauses protecting slavery, which
were diametrically opposed to the universal statement of rights found in the
Declaration. Section 5's supermajority requirement for amending the
Constitution made it impossible until the Civil War to bring that document
in line with the nation's founding mandate of human equality.
After the Civil War, the nation was reborn. Using the moral compass
to reconstruct the country, Radical Republicans secured ratification of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. The ending of slavery,
safeguarding of citizenship, due process and equal protection, and securing
of franchise brought the nation more in line with its founding mandate of
liberal equality for the common good. Debates on the Reconstruction
Amendments make clear that the Declaration's second paragraph is
incorporated into the reconstructed Constitution. The values of innate rights
and self-government mandated by the Declaration for the nation as a whole
are constitutionally binding by this incorporation and should be used as
deciding values in cases involving human dignity, such as Obergefell and
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.

